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ABSTRACT 
 
Some authors emphasize overconfidence may benefit managers by increasing decision-making 
efficiency, whereas others argue it results in serious errors. This study helps resolve the 
debate by examining the relationship between overconfidence and product performance, as 
well as testing whether planning might mediate the link. The study sampled 52 small computer 
companies that had decided to introduce a product.  It examined the manager’s 
overconfidence and planning when the product was launched and measured the product’s 
performance 18 months later.  We found that overconfidence decreased planning, planning 
decreased performance, and, as hypothesized, planning mediated the relationship between the 
two other variables. By examining the meditating role of planning, we were able to better 
identify the causal relationships and clarify the effects of overconfidence.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Seminal works (e.g., Blau & Schoenherr, 
1971; Galbraith, 1977) suggest that 
managers in small businesses, as opposed 
to those in larger companies, may face 
different challenges and employ different 
processes when making strategic 
decisions. Often they have fewer 
resources and formal processes, making it 
more difficult to remove initial uncertainty 
when making strategic decisions (Simon, 
Houghton & Savelli, 2003).  This 
uncertainty is multiplied when managers 
employ a strategy of introducing new 
products in dynamic environments (Simon 
& Houghton, 2003).  Dynamic markets 
make it difficult for managers to use 
historical knowledge to inform current 
choices.  It is, for example, difficult in 
dynamic environments to discern 
customer preference and which 
competitors will be relevant (e.g., Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Brinckmann, Grichnik, & Kapsa, 2010).  
 
As explained by Heuer (1999), the mind is 
poorly "wired" to deal effectively with 
this inherent uncertainty. Therefore, when 
facing uncertain conditions, some 
managers deny it exists, exhibiting 
overconfidence (Busenitz & Barney, 
1997; Simon & Houghton, 2003). 
Overconfidence occurs when one’s 
certainty of specific facts exceeds the 
accuracy of his or her knowledge 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992).  Specifically, scholars 
(e.g., D'Souza & Kemelgor, 2008; Liao, 
Welsch, & Stoica, 2008;  McNamara & 
Bromiley, 1997; Simon & Houghton, 
2003)  have suggested that overconfidence 
is more likely to occur when coping with 
dynamic environments, ill-structured 
decisions, and introducing pioneering 
products, and it may be especially 
prevalent among smaller firms. 
Virtually every business study of 
overconfidence acknowledges that 
overconfidence may be beneficial by 
increasing decision-making efficiency 
(Hayward, Forster, Sarasvathy, & 
Fredrickson, 2010), but that it also could 
result in errors that are large, persistent 
and serious (Hayward, Shepherd, & 
Griffin, 2006). Yet, these contradictory 
implications have not been reconciled 
empirically, to date (e.g., Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005).  Some 
researchers maintain that the incorrect 
facts of overconfident managers hurt 
business performance because these 
managers rush to action and leapfrog 
classical decision formulation and 
implementation steps (Hayward et al., 
2006).  In particular, they argue that 
overconfidence may encourage the 
managers to ignore planning and start 
down a false path. And without planning, 
some assert, economic performance will 
suffer. 
 
Other scholars, however, do not accept 
this negative view of overconfidence as 
universally applicable (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997). While most accept that 
overconfidence may reduce planning, they 
believe that in certain circumstances, such 
as dynamic environments, planning is not 
useful. McGrath and MacMillan (1995), 
for example, argue that in dynamic 
environments, planning does not work 
because there is little data upon which to 
base projections. These, and other 
scholars, contend that planning leads to a 
futile search for "reliable" information 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Houghton, 
Simon, Aquino, & Goldberg, 2000).  
Furthermore, by skipping planning, these 
managers may avoid locking into 
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rationales based on outdated beliefs about 
the emerging market situation.  
 
The above suggests that understanding the 
extent and effects of planning seems to lie 
at the center of the debate about the 
effects of overconfidence on performance.  
As such, the core question arises; does 
planning mediate the relationship between 
overconfidence and performance, and if 
so, how?  Examining potential mediators, 
such as planning, helps identify 
underlying processes, which, in turn, can 
provide insights into contradictory 
conclusions about relationships (Hedstrom 
& Swedberg, 1998). If planning mediates 
the effects of overconfidence on 
performance, it may serve as a generative 
mechanism and increase our 
understanding of cause and effect. In 
addition, by examining the role of 
planning as a mediator, we can also 
identify the relationships, in dynamic 
markets, between overconfidence and 
planning; as well as, between planning 
and product introduction success.   
 
The following section reviews the study's 
theoretical model and presents the 
hypotheses.  We then detail the research 
methods and report the results of the 
analysis. Finally, the article discusses the 
study's findings and implications. 
 
OVERCONFIDENCE, PLANNING 
AND PERFORMANCE 
 
Smaller firm size is associated with less 
structural inertia (Blau & Schoenherr, 
1971), more centralization (Blau & 
Schoenherr, 1971), less formalization 
(Blau & Schoenherr, 1971), and greater 
strategic change (Kelly & Amburgey, 
1991).  These organizational 
characteristics suggest that strategic 
decision making is often not codified, 
sometimes resulting in the lack of 
procedural buffers and formal processes to 
“rationalize” the decision-making process 
(Simon et al., 2003).  Thus, small firm 
managers may face great uncertainty when 
making strategic decisions. 
 
Pursuing a strategy of introducing 
products in dynamic markets exacerbates 
this challenge.  In dynamic markets, past 
experiences and successes cannot be 
extrapolated to guide current competitive 
behaviors; consumer tastes are unclear, 
the range of current competitors is 
changing, and historical key success 
factors may be unimportant in the 
changing circumstances.  Yet even when 
faced with such a murky, ambiguous 
setting, managers of small firms must 
somehow eventually learn about their 
products' markets, technologies, and 
competition (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Brinckmann et al., 2010).  
 
We use the term planning to refer to the 
structured information gathering and 
analyzing process that takes place prior to 
acting.  Planning involves 
comprehensively, exhaustively, and 
inclusively searching for and evaluating 
information that is deemed relevant by the 
decision makers.  Planning is a highly 
analytical process that involves much up-
front homework, and uses a multitude of 
techniques, such as Delphi analysis, 
concept tests, focus groups, and surveys, 
which all attempt to build an 
understanding of the competitive 
environment before launching a new 
initiative (Lynn, Morone, & Paulson, 
1996). Through the planning exercises, 
managers socially construct a detailed 
schema of their competitive environment, 
comprised of cause and effect 
relationships, which guide their creation 
of a sequence of detailed action steps 
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(Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Lynn et 
al., 1996).  
 
Planning relies primarily on historical 
understandings of the environment or 
interpretation of responses to hypothetical 
questions, such as whether one might 
purchase a yet-to-be-developed product.  
It is important to distinguish planning 
from decision comprehensiveness 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; 2001).  Although the 
two can overlap, the latter is a broader 
concept.  Comprehensive decision making 
can emphasize collecting data after an 
action, and/or basing decisions on real 
time operating information (Eisenhardt, 
1989; 2001).   
 
Overconfidence and Planning 
Although overconfidence may be 
influenced by both dispositional and 
contextual factors (Forbes, 2005), this 
study focuses on the dispositional 
component, consistent with our effort to 
study overconfidence in similar contexts 
across firms.  Some people exhibit a 
tendency to be more overconfident than 
others (Forbes, 2005; Klayman, Soll, 
Gonzalez-Vallerjo, & Barlas, 1999; Soll, 
1996; Yates, Lee, Shinotsuka, Patalano, & 
Sieck, 1998).  For example, Klayman et 
al. (1999) found that certain people 
consistently expressed greater 
overconfidence in their information, 
regardless of whether that information was 
about presidents, prices of consumer 
goods, or life expectancies. These 
tendencies stem from cognitive trails 
etched in the minds of individuals (Haley 
& Stumpf, 1989) based upon stable 
factors such as long-standing habits (Yates 
et al., 1998), firmly established cognitive 
customs (Yates et al., 1998), and 
established personality types (Soll, 1996). 
Forbes (2005) found that several of the 
determinants of overconfidence were 
related to relatively stable individual 
differences. Consistent with this logic, 
Busenitz and Barney (1997) proposed that 
overconfidence was a quasi-trait and 
people high in the trait self-selected 
toward entrepreneurship. 
 
We are interested in the extent to which 
variations in overconfidence affect the 
amount of planning when introducing a 
product in a dynamic environment.  Given 
the unreliability of data related to product 
introductions in dynamic environments, 
managers who are not overconfident of 
their knowledge will realize that they do 
not have accurate information.  This 
realization, in turn, may cause a manager 
to experience substantial uncertainty, 
where uncertainty is defined as the gap 
between the information one has and the 
information one needs to perform a task 
(Forbes, 2007).  Feelings of uncertainty 
may inhibit proceeding with an action 
until the feelings are reduced (Brinckmann 
et al., 2010).  One of the classic 
uncertainty-reducing procedures managers 
use is planning (Brinckmann et al., 2010).  
The process of gathering and analyzing 
more information alleviates feelings of 
discomfort before launching a product 
(Galbraith, 1977).  Thus, is it not 
surprising that managers will initiate a 
more extensive search for information 
before deciding to act to reduce 
uncertainty (e.g., Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 
1988). Specifically, Milliken (1987) 
contends that the greater the managers’ 
uncertainty about the state of the 
environment, the more time and resources 
they will invest in planning, through 
increased forecasting.  Furthermore, 
Brinckmann et al. (2010) found that 
managers exhibiting greater uncertainty 
are more likely to develop plans.   
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This planning-dominated behavior stands 
in stark contrast to the behaviors of 
managers who are overconfident. These 
managers, by definition, believe that they 
already have sufficient information, so 
they may proceed immediately with their 
product launch and largely bypass the 
planning process. Mahajan (1992) argued 
that managers who are overconfident will 
commit resources without waiting to 
collect additional information. Along 
related lines, Cooper, Folta, and Woo 
(1995) determined that overconfident 
individuals do less searching for 
information when initiating a business.  
Furthermore, Schwenk (1986) suggested 
that a manager's overconfidence could 
engender commitment from others to 
ideas, even when their information is quite 
incomplete. Thus, overconfidence may 
encourage managers to take action without 
engaging in extensive information search, 
analysis and planning prior to starting an 
initiative. These arguments lead to the first 
hypothesis:  
  
Hypothesis 1: Overconfidence 
decreases planning for product 
introductions. 
 
Planning and Priduct Introduction 
Performance in Dynamic Markets 
We believe that planning has a negative 
relationship with product introduction 
performance in dynamic markets based on 
four key factors.  First, planning can 
become expensive (Forbes, 2007).  The 
employee costs associated with the time 
spent acquiring and analyzing data, 
preparing reports, and discussing 
alternatives may be substantial.  And this 
is to say nothing of the monetary outlays 
associated with mailings, presentations, 
and computer time. Of course, this 
investment could be justified if planning 
generated useful results. This, however, 
brings us to the second reason why we 
believe planning is negatively correlated 
with product performance in dynamic 
environments.  In dynamic environments, 
conditions can change in an instant, 
rendering planning-based information 
obsolete (e.g., Miller, 1996). For example, 
in response to a new introduction, other 
companies may lower their prices, 
increase their advertising, or modify their 
own current offerings. Planning data 
cannot incorporate these market responses 
because planning data are historical, not 
proactively generated based on 
experimental action (Bourgeois & 
Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995).  As explained by McGrath and 
MacMillan (1995), in dynamic 
environments, reliable and predictable 
knowledge of well-understood business 
has not yet emerged and managers only 
have access to assumptions about possible 
futures. Thus, managers who rely on 
planning will be wasting precious 
resources on studying a condition that 
ceases to exist as soon as they act. 
 
The third reason why planning may 
decrease product introduction 
performance is because it may delay 
product launches. Decision-making speed 
is particularly important in dynamic 
environments. While, in theory, planning 
may increase product introduction speed 
by launching managers on “correct” paths 
(e.g., Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1996), in 
dynamic settings, reliable information is 
unavailable, so planning is not likely to 
lead to the correct path (e.g., Lynn et al., 
1996).  Delays are one of the most 
significant problems that managers face 
when introducing new products.  They 
decrease a firm’s profits, diminish 
competitive advantage, and minimize the 
ability to adapt to a changing environment 
(Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1996; 
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Eisenhardt, 1989).  And while one may 
make rapid decisions using certain 
processes even if they engage in 
comprehensive decision making; 
following a planning process does not 
seem to produce this outcome (Eisenhardt, 
1989; 2001). Further, products are 
growing obsolete at an increasing rate and 
windows of opportunity are closing more 
rapidly than we have seen historically.  
 
Lastly, even after the planning process is 
complete, it still may decrease the 
manager’s ability to recognize and/or 
respond to new, ongoing, real-time 
information (Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 
1993), a process that is critical for 
managers of small businesses (Parker, 
2006).  Based on structured analyses of 
historical and non-direct product data 
(such as focus groups), the planning 
process creates an intricate articulation of 
underlying beliefs and elaborate schemas 
about the environment. When the planning 
is completed, the management team 
believes that it has an understanding of 
how to proceed. The planning-generated 
schema becomes a robust information-
processing template that leads to 
formulaic thinking and acting (Day & 
Nedungadi 1994), creating cognitive 
rigidities in the belief system of the 
managers (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  The 
manager may find it difficult to 
acknowledge discordant feedback and 
unlearn important assumptions and beliefs 
about the environment (Nystrom & 
Starbuck, 1984).   
 
Collectively, the arguments above suggest 
that the product introduction expenses, 
delays, and cognitive rigidities associated 
with planning in dynamic environments 
will not generate a return in the form of 
more useful information.  Given these 
arguments, it is not surprising that seminal 
articles (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984) 
have found that although planning is 
associated with higher performance in 
stable industries, it is associated with 
decreased performance in unstable ones. 
Therefore, hypothesis two follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In dynamic 
environments, planning decreases the 
economic performance of new 
product introductions.  
 
Planning as a Mediator of 
Overconfidence on Performance 
Notwithstanding hypotheses one and two, 
the question remains, does planning 
mediate the relationship between 
overconfidence and performance?  
Identifying planning as a mediator would 
provide evidence of a causal mechanism 
between overconfidence and performance. 
Hypotheses one and two represent two of 
the conditions that need to be present to 
establish that planning is a mediator. 
Collectively, they suggest that lower 
overconfidence leads to more planning, 
and more planning leads to lower 
performance. As such, they represent 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to 
indicate that planning mediates the 
overconfidence-performance relationship 
(Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998). 
 
Nevertheless, we do believe the other 
conditions exist, and that planning 
mediates the relationship between 
overconfidence and performance. In 
addition to confirming hypotheses one and 
two, the argument for mediation must also 
establish that overconfidence would not 
have a direct effect, or would have less of 
a direct effect, on performance when 
planning is present in the model.  We 
believe this to be the case because 
overconfidence is a cognitive process, and 
is therefore unlikely to directly influence a 
26 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
firm level outcome.  Instead, cognitive 
processes are more likely to have an effect 
through their influence on a variable that 
reflects actions, such as planning (Simon, 
Houghton, & Savelli, 2000).  Actions, like 
planning, would then influence the 
outcome (Simon and Houghton, 2003). 
Several empirical studies in other areas 
have uncovered similar mediated 
relationship among cognitions, actions, 
and performance (e.g., King, Dalton, 
Daily, & Covin, 2004). Furthermore, if 
planning does mediate the relationship 
between overconfidence and performance, 
it would help explain why scholars 
reached different conclusions about the 
effects of overconfidence (King et al., 
2004). Therefore, hypothesis three 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Planning mediates the 
effect of overconfidence on the 
economic performance of new 
product introductions in dynamic 
environments. 
 
METHODS 
 
Most research assessing cognitive biases 
has used a laboratory design approach 
(Camerer & Lovallo, 1999).  Laboratory 
findings have encouraged researchers to 
call for field studies that examine the 
effects of biases in real business situations 
(Staw, 1991).  In response, the current 
study examines the effects of 
overconfidence on the performance of an 
actual product that a company had 
recently introduced.  We focused on just 
one product per firm; managers are best 
able to judge performance at this level, 
and aggregating all of a firm’s products 
confounds the influence of a given 
variable on a product's performance 
(Maidique & Zirger, 1985). We gathered 
data at two time periods.  Near the time 
the product was first launched, we 
measured the extent of the manager’s 
overconfidence and his or her use of 
planning.  Eighteen months later, we 
measured the product’s overall 
performance. 
 
The study focused on the top managers of 
smaller companies (under 100 employees) 
in the computer industry. As 
recommended by Barczak (1994), we 
focused on one industry because 
simultaneously examining multiple 
industries may have confounded the 
results of many past product introduction 
studies. The computer industry was an 
especially relevant setting for our study 
because it is known for its dynamism 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). The industry 
is dominated by frequent product 
introductions, short product lifecycles, and 
rapidly shifting competitive landscapes 
(Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
 
The sample was selected from the Georgia 
Technology Sourcebook, which contains a 
comprehensive list of Georgia-based high-
technology companies. The directory 
indicated that there were 213 Georgia-
based computer firms that had fewer than 
100 employees. We contacted each of the 
companies by phone to determine whether 
it anticipated introducing a product to the 
market shortly or had just done so. One 
hundred thirty-five companies met all of 
the study's criteria.  Sixty-one of the firms 
agreed to participate and provided all the 
information needed for the first stage of 
the study, generating a response rate of 
45%.  The firms of respondents did not 
differ from those of non-respondents 
regarding number of employees or 
company age at the 0.05 level of 
significance. Each of the firms had just 
launched a product within the past 3 
months or anticipated a launch within 30 
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days.  Following a pilot test, we gathered 
data from the individual who was most 
responsible for making decisions 
regarding the product introduction. Thirty 
of the respondents were at the highest 
level within the company, (CEOs or 
Presidents), while the remaining 31 
respondents were one level below.  
Responding firms were, on average, 10 
years old and had 20 employees. Eighteen 
months later, we surveyed the firms 
regarding the product’s overall 
performance. Managers from 52 of the 
original firms responded, generating an 
85% response rate for the second phase of 
the study and an overall response rate of 
39% for both stages. (Appendix A details 
the specific steps taken to gather follow-
up data.) 
 
Overconfidence 
Consistent with foundational 
overconfidence studies (Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992; Yates et al., 1998), we 
defined overconfidence as being overly 
certain of one’s facts. Overconfidence was 
measured by asking managers to respond 
to factual questions that had clear-cut right 
and wrong answers, and then to predict 
the accuracy of their responses. The 
managers were given two possible 
responses and asked to select the one they 
thought was correct.  After choosing, they 
recorded how confident they were that 
their answer was right on a scale ranging 
from 50 to 100%.  They would not put 
down less than 50% because that would 
suggest they should have selected the 
other choice.  A response of 50% would 
indicate that they thought their response 
was a total guess, while 70% would 
indicate that they thought they had seven 
chances in ten of being correct. Managers 
were overconfident if they believed that 
they were accurate more often than they 
actually were. Specifically, each 
respondent's overconfidence was 
determined by averaging his or her level 
of confidence for all seven of the 
questions and subtracting the percentage 
of items correct; the greater the difference, 
the greater the degree of overconfidence.  
 
Although an individual's tendency towards 
overconfidence is relatively stable across 
decision domains (Yates et al., 1998), we 
took the added precaution of tailoring the 
instrument questions to the general type of 
information that managers might use when 
deciding whether to introduce a product 
within the computer industry. For 
example, respondents were asked, "Which 
of the following PC 'markets' grew more 
rapidly last year?" The two possible 
answers provided were "retail sales” or 
“corporate sales." Eight experts 
specializing in the computer industry 
and/or product introductions (including a 
venture capitalist), two directors of risk 
assessment centers, and an academic 
confirmed the relevance of the questions 
to the computer industry (listed in 
Appendix B).   
 
We did not want the measure of 
overconfidence to be influenced by recent 
experiences of the managers. To avoid this 
potential confound, we were careful to 
limit the topics of the questions to general 
information that managers might use, 
excluding questions about specific 
information that managers did actually use 
when introducing a product in the 
computer industry.  This precaution 
insured that the respondent’s rating of his 
or her confidence in their information 
accuracy was unlikely to change as a 
result of any specific product outcome 
experience.  Consistent with traditional 
measures, our method did not capture 
one’s optimism about an outcome or one’s 
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tendency to overestimate one's general 
skills. 
 
Planning   
The study used three close-ended survey 
items adapted from past research to gather 
data about the degree to which managers 
engaged in planning.  Managers 
responded on a five-point Likert-type 
scale that ranged from "strongly disagree" 
to "strongly agree." 
 
 
Product Performance 
To measure product success, the study 
assessed outcomes that were directly 
related to the product's economic 
performance, including the product's 
profitability, sales, market share, and 
financial success. Consistent with past 
research (e.g., Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1996), we used self-report measures rather 
than more objective ones, because small 
firms often do not have the sophisticated 
accounting systems needed to provide 
"hard" data regarding a product's financial 
performance (Covin, Prescott, & Slevin, 
1990). Instead, we argue that product’s 
performance can best be judged by the 
party who is most knowledgeable about 
the product introduction and most 
responsible for its success or failure (i.e., 
the respondent manager). Furthermore, 
although not directly focusing on product 
introduction performance, research by 
Dess and Robinson (1984) suggests that 
subjective performance measures are 
appropriate when objective performance 
data may be unavailable, because the two 
types of measures are highly correlated. 
For example, in our study, overall product 
performance was associated with the 
extent to which the product's profit margin 
was higher than that of the company 
(r=0.30, p<0.05, n=30), the percent of 
company sales the product generated 
(r=0.36, p<0.01, n =41), and the percent of 
company profits the product generated (r= 
0.40, p<0.01, n=33).   
 
In the context of our study, however, the 
subjective measure of performance raised 
a potential concern: Will managers who 
were more overconfident of their general 
computer industry information in Phase I 
of the data collection overstate 
performance in Phase II? We argue that 
they will not for several reasons. First, 
empirical studies have found no 
relationship between overconfidence and 
perceiving low risk or between 
overconfidence and optimism (Astebro & 
Adomdza, 2007; Houghton et al., 2000; 
Keh, Foo, & Lim, 2002).  The measure of 
overconfidence allows the manager to be 
overly confident of negative information, 
while optimism is a bias of 
overconfidence only in positive 
information. For example, the respondent 
would be overconfident, but not 
optimistic, if he or she expressed certainty 
of the size of a relevant market segment, 
yet they underestimated the market size.  
Second, affect factors that might lead to 
overstating performance, such as the need 
to maintain a high self-esteem, or thinking 
highly of one’s general skills, are also not 
associated with overconfidence (Forbes, 
2005; Yates et al., 1998). This provides 
additional confirmation that 
overconfidence, in and of itself, does not 
influence the assessment of performance.  
Finally, we believe that measuring 
performance 18 months after we measured 
overconfidence and using widely different 
measurement formats (i.e., composite 
percentages for overconfidence; Likert 
scales for performance) also minimized 
the chance of inducing a specious 
relationship between the two variables. 
Thus, there is little reason to believe that 
overconfident managers, as we use the 
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term, would systematically overestimate 
performance 18 months later.  
 
Controls 
The larger the company, the more 
extensive the use of planning (Delvecchio 
& Anselmi, 2006).  Therefore, when 
testing hypothesis one, the effects of 
overconfidence on planning, we controlled 
for the effects of company size.  
Consistent with past literature, we used 
the log of number of company employees.  
We also included two control variables, 
namely cross-functional communication 
and past company performance, when 
examining hypothesis two, the effects of 
planning on performance. Scholars have 
found that cross-functional 
communication enhances new product 
performance, arguing the effects of this 
variable may be one of the strongest and 
most robust findings in the new product 
literature (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). 
We measured cross-functional 
communication using the average score of 
a two-item scale.  
 
We also included past company 
performance as a control variable, as it 
might be directly associated with 
performance when facing a changing 
environment (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 
2000).  Consistent with past research 
(Covin et al., 1990), we first asked 
managers to rate how satisfied they were 
with the firm's performance on six 
economic criteria and then to indicate how 
important each criterion was to them. We 
then multiplied the performance scores by 
the importance scores for each of the six 
criteria and summed the results. This 
process generated a weighted average 
performance index for each firm.  Using 
the manager's assessment of past 
performance helps partial out any variance 
that might be caused by a manager’s 
general tendency to be optimistic or 
pessimistic that might also affect their 
assessment of current performance.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The data were analyzed with structural 
equation modeling technique (i.e., 
LISREL). LISREL allows us to test the 
hypothesized relationships by examining 
the paths among overconfidence, 
planning, and product performance.  
Researchers (e.g., Iacobucci, Saldanha, & 
Deng 2007; Zhao, Lynch, & Chen 2010) 
have claimed that using LISREL to test 
mediation (hypothesis 3) is superior to 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure.  
LISREL allows us to estimate the model 
simultaneously instead of assuming that 
the three regression equations which test 
for mediation are independent, as required 
by Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure. 
Furthermore, LISREL allows us to use 
each of the individual measures to capture 
constructs, which may be a better option 
than using scale means to represent the 
constructs, as is the norm when using the 
Baron and Kenny’s mediation test. 
Following Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) 
two-step process, we first assess the 
measurement model, and then examine the 
structural model for the testing of the 
substantive hypotheses 1 through 3. 
 
Measurement Model Assessment 
Table 1 reports the constructs’ descriptive 
statistics, correlations, Cronbach alpha 
(), average variance extracted (AVE), 
and the chi-square differences (2) 
between models with fixed versus free 
correlations between pairs of 
constructs/variables. The descriptive 
statistics include means, standard 
deviations, skewness, kurtosis, range, and 
the number of items used to measure each 
variable. The skewness values are 
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between minus 2 and plus 2. The kurtosis 
values are between minus 5 and plus 5.  
These values provide evidences that all 
three variables are normally distributed 
(Ghiselli, Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981).  
 
All three variables are significantly 
correlated with each other (p < 0.01). 
Overconfidence is negatively and 
significantly correlated with planning (r = 
-0.52). Product performance is positively 
and significantly correlated with over 
confidence (r = 0.37) and negatively and 
significantly with planning (r = -0.57). 
Reliabilities are measured by Cronbach 
alpha (). An alpha value of 0.7 or above 
indicates a good measurement scale 
(Nunnally, 1978). The reliabilities of 0.77 
for planning and 0.86 for product 
performance suggest that both 
measurement scales have adequate 
reliability. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, Reliability, Average Variance Extracted, 
and Chi-Square Test of Discriminant Validity among Three Variables 
 
 Overconfidence Planning Product Performance 
Mean 0.11 2.91 3.98 
Standard Deviation 0.16 0.74 1.29 
Skewness 0.10 -0.04 -0.49 
Kurtosis 0.38 -0.08 -0.04 
Range -0.25-1.00 1-5 1-7 
# of Items 1 3 5 
    
--   Overconfidence 
--   
-0.52  = 0.77  Planning 
2=44.91 AVE=0.54  
0.37 -0.57  = 0.86 Product 
Performance 2=207.98 2=26.26 AVE=0.57 
 
For convergent validity of a scale, AVE 
should be above 0.50 (Segars, 1997). The 
AVE values are 0.54 for planning and 0.57 
for product performance, respectively. 
Convergent validity is also assessed by how 
well the items load on their respective 
construct. Figure 1 depicts standardized 
item-factor loadings (s) for all three 
variables in Table 1. All the standardized 
item-factor loadings are 0.71 (t=5.81) or 
higher. Both the AVE values and 
standardized item-factor loadings suggest 
that the measurement models have adequate 
convergent validity. 
 
For discriminant validity, the AVE scores 
for each variable should be greater than the 
square of the correlation between the focal 
variable and other variables. An 
examination of Table 1 shows that the AVE 
scores for planning and product 
performance are greater than the square of 
the correlation between the focal-factor and 
other factors, suggesting adequate 
discriminant validity. A more rigorous chi-
square (2) test of discriminant validity is to 
examine whether a unidimensional rather 
than a two-dimensional model can account 
for the intercorrelations among the observed 
items in each pair (Segars, 1997). For the 
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Over 
Confidence 
Formal 
Planning 
Product 
Performance 
Plan1 Perf1 
χ2=26.73; df=25; χ2/df=1.07; p-value=0.36947; RMSEA=0.030; NNFI=0.99; CFI=1.00 
Ovc1 Perf2 Perf3 Perf4 Perf5 Plan2 Plan3 
0.40 0.49 0.00 0.46 0.37 0.36 0.50 0.49 0.48 
0.77 0.72 1.00 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.71 0.71 0.72 
-0.59 -0.70 
0.40 
three comparisons, the adjusted chi-square 
value for the test of discriminant validity 
between pairs of constructs must be equal to 
or greater than 8.62 for significance at p < 
0.01 (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Findings 
reported in Table 1 indicate that all chi-
square differences are significant at the p < 
0.01 level, suggesting discriminant validity 
between each pair of constructs.  
 
 
Figure 1: Three Factor Measurement Model (Standardized 
Solution)
 
The model-data fit was evaluated by chi-
square, degrees of freedom, p-value, root 
mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA), non-normed fit index (NNFI), 
and comparative fit index (CFI). RMSEA 
value less than 0.050 suggests good model-
data fit (Steiger & Lind, 1980). NNFI and 
CFI indices greater than 0.90 suggest good 
model-data fit (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980; 
Bentler, 1990; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1989). 
The three-factor/construct correlated 
measurement model (see Figure 1) was 
assessed to have good model-data fit with 
2 = 26.73 for 25 degrees of freedom, chi-
square per degree of freedom = 1.07, p-
value = 0.36947, RMSEA = 0.030, NNFI = 
0.99, and CFI =1.00. Each of the items had 
item-factor loadings greater than 0.71. No 
major modification index has been 
suggested for possible improvements to the 
model. Having found that the three factor 
correlated measurement model has good 
model-data fit, we proceed to examine the 
structural model and test the hypotheses. 
The Structural Model: Assessing 
Substantive Hypotheses H1 thru H3 
Figure 2 illustrates the structural 
relationships () between the exogenous 
variable (ξ) overconfidence and the 
endogenous variable () planning. It also 
depicts the structural relationship () 
between planning and product performance. 
The structural model (see Figure 2) 
indicates good model-data fit (a chi-square 
of 26.78 for 26 degrees of freedom, chi-
square per degree of freedom = 1.03, p-
value = 0.42080, RMSEA = 0.020, NNFI = 
1.00, and CFI = 1.00). 
 
The good model-data fit permits us to 
examine the hypotheses. Overconfidence 
has a significant path coefficient ( = -0.58, 
t = -4.59, p < 0.01) to planning. Thus, 
hypothesis H1, overconfidence decreases 
planning for product introductions, is 
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supported. Planning also has a significant 
path coefficient ( = -0.70, t = -4.60, p < 
0.01) to product performance. Thus, 
hypothesis H2, in dynamic environments, 
planning decreases the economic 
performance of new product introductions, 
is supported. The variance explained in 
planning and product performance by the 
model is 34% ( = 0.66) and 49% ( = 
0.51), respectively. 
 
Figure 2: Structural Model for Hypotheses Testing 
To test hypothesis H3, we followed the 
steps suggested by Iacobucci (2008).  First, 
a baseline structural model was constructed 
to connect overconfidence directly to 
product performance.  This baseline model 
had good model-data fit (chi-square of 
10.30 for 9 degrees of freedom, chi-square 
per degree of freedom = 1.14, p-value = 
0.32700, RMSEA = 0.043, NNFI = 0.99, 
and CFI = 1.00).  Overconfidence had a 
significant path coefficient ( = 0.40, t = 
3.18, p < 0.01) to product performance.  
The variance explained in product 
performance by the model was 17% ( = 
0.83).  This baseline model demonstrated 
that overconfidence had a significant, direct 
relationship with product performance.  
Second, planning was introduced to the 
baseline model to mediate the direct 
overconfidence - product performance 
relationship.  The re-constructed structural 
model had good model-data fit (see Figure 
2). Overconfidence had a significant path 
coefficient to planning and the planning 
also had a significant path coefficient to 
product performance. Thus, hypothesis H3, 
planning will mediate the effect of 
overconfidence on the economic 
performance of new product introductions 
in dynamic environments, is supported.  
Third, a direct path from overconfidence to 
product performance was added to the 
model and tested for significance.  The 
added path was not significant, suggesting 
that planning fully mediated the relationship 
between overconfidence and product 
performance (Iacobucci, 2008). 
 
Control variables (firm size, past 
performance, and cross-functional 
communication) were introduced to Figure 
2 one at a time. Firm size was found to 
significantly enhance planning ( = 0.29, t = 
2.74, p < 0.05). Cross-functional 
communication was found to significantly 
improve product performance ( = 0.24, t = 
2.37, p < 0.05). However, past performance 
was found to have no significant impact on 
product performance.  None of these control 
variables had changed the fact that planning 
fully mediated the relationship between 
overconfidence and product performance.  
The combined structural model is depicted 
in Figure 3, where firm size and cross 
functional are introduced to the model 
simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
Over 
Confidence Planning 
Product 
Performance 
β= - 0.70 = - 0.58 
(t= - 4.60) (t= - 4.59)
=0.66 =0.51 
χ2=26.78; df=26; χ2/df=1.03; p-value=0.42080; RMSEA=0.020; NNFI=1.00; CFI=1.00 
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DISCUSSION 
 
Our findings add to the literature by 
identifying that planning mediates the 
relationship between overconfidence and 
product performance.  Uncovering a 
previously unidentified mediator suggests 
that scholars may have underspecified the 
effects of overconfidence on a product’s 
performance. This mediation indicates that 
planning is a generative mechanism, 
thereby helping enhance our understanding 
of cause and effect.  
 
 
Figure 3: Structural Model with Significant Control Variables Included 
 
Cross Functional 
Communication 
Firm Size 
 
By identifying variables that serve as 
intermediate actions, our model contributes 
to an understanding of the complex causal 
chain that starts with overconfidence and 
ends with product performance.   
 
More specifically, identifying planning as a 
mediator helps resolve a controversy in the 
literature.  Prior research indicates that 
many managers of small firms may use 
biases, such as overconfidence, when 
making strategic decisions (Liao et al., 
2008).  Some argue that overconfidence 
hurts performance by causing managers to 
bypass planning, thereby starting down the 
wrong path.  Other scholars, however, 
believe that overconfident managers save 
time and resources by avoiding a futile 
search for "reliable" information that 
initially does not exist in dynamic 
environments. These scholars also assert 
that overconfidence may generate action 
that produces useful feedback.  Thus, a 
contribution of the current paper is to 
provide insight into this intense debate, 
which prior to this effort, to the best of our 
knowledge, has not been examined 
empirically. 
 
We examine how overconfidence influences 
product performance through its effect on 
planning in dynamic environments.  We 
found that overconfidence is associated 
with less planning (H1) and that less 
planning was associated with improved 
product performance (H2). Furthermore, 
planning fully mediated the relationship 
between overconfidence and performance 
(H3).  Collectively, these finding help 
resolve the contradictory suggestions of 
scholars about the effects of overconfidence 
on performance. 
Over 
Confidence 
Formal 
Planning 
=0.29 =0.24 
(t=2.75) (t=2.38)
Product 
Performance 
β= - 0.67 = - 0.58 
(t= - 4.68) (t= - 4.83)
=0.57 =0.47 
χ2=40.30; df=40; χ2/df=1.01; p-value=0.45678; RMSEA=0.010; NNFI=1.00; CFI=1.00 
34 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
It is important to note that our research does 
not examine the precise dynamic by which 
managers succeed, even if they are initially 
overconfident.  We believe that adaptive 
sense-making, as compared to planning, 
may be more likely to lead to success in 
dynamic markets, although admittedly we 
did not explicitly test this assertion.   
Adaptive sense-making refers to making 
rapid decisions based on post-launch 
information gathering and taking 
experimental actions to generate more 
feedback about the emerging environment 
(Bogner & Barr, 2000). The process 
facilitates understandings that are grounded 
in real time, not retrospective behaviors and 
information.   Furthermore, by bypassing 
planning, we believe being overconfident of 
one’s facts may lead to rapid action,which 
is a prerequisite to adaptive sense-making.  
Because overconfident managers have not 
developed and committed to a detailed 
cause and effect schema, they are likely to 
notice and accept relevant feedback, which, 
given their confidence, the manager react to 
with great alacrity.  
 
Furthermore, even if some of the unfolding 
information contradicted their initial beliefs, 
they might be more willing to modify those 
beliefs, given that they have not made large 
tangible or emotional investments in them.  
Their ability to become confident allows 
them to iterate rapidly multiple times 
between acting, feedback, and adjusting, 
which, in turn, generates the intuition 
needed in dynamic environments 
(Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  Ultimately, 
they generate constantly evolving schemas 
that are complex, based on relevant 
information, and contain ever increasingly 
useful cause and effect understanding which 
are needed for new product success. 
 
Alternatively, managers who are initially 
overconfident may engage in improvisation 
(Crossan, Cuhna & Cuhna, 2005).  
According to Crossan, Lane, White, and 
Klus (1996), improvisation can reflect 
taking advantage of opportunities as they 
unfold and capture a mix of strategy 
formulation and implementation. Weick 
(2001) further explains that improvisation 
involves less investment in front-end 
loading (trying to anticipate everything that 
will happen or that you will need) and 
instead focuses on a greater reliance on the 
ability to do a quick study, intuitions, and 
sophistication in cutting losses.  As such 
improvisation’s emphasis on an 
experimental culture, real-time information 
and communication (Crossan et al., 2005) 
may make it ideal for dealing with dynamic 
environments.  
 
The current paper complements several 
works on confidence and overconfidence in 
business settings.  The largest group of 
these papers contain measures whose 
format was identical to (e.g., Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997; Forbes, 2005) or only 
slightly different from (e.g., Keh et al., 
2002; Simon et al., 2000) the one used in 
this paper.  All of this research measured 
the individual’s confidence and accuracy 
regarding factual information. These studies 
added greatly to our knowledge of many 
topics, including risk perception (Simon et 
al., 2000), differences between 
entrepreneurs and managers (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997), opportunity identification 
(Keh et al., 2002), and antecedent to 
overconfidence (Forbes, 2005).  However, 
despite the authors' comments about the 
importance of a link between 
overconfidence and performance, none 
captured the direction of this relationship. 
  
Other research measured or discussed 
overconfidence in a way that is almost 
synonymous with poor organizational 
performance.  For example, although 
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appropriate for their research questions, 
Isabella and Waddock (1994) measured 
confidence as optimistic predictions about 
performance outcomes and discussed 
overconfidence as being optimistic and 
failing to achieve positive results. Similarly, 
Simon, Houghton, and Savelli’s (2003) 
field study determined that overconfidence 
occurred when a manager was 100% certain 
that a product introduction would achieve a 
success factor and ultimately failed to do so.  
Both of these studies’ measures made it 
definitional that overconfidence would yield 
lower performance. Our measure of 
overconfidence did not involve predictions 
of future performance, but instead focused 
on inappropriate certainty in current 
knowledge.  Thus, it was potentially 
possible to detect a positive association 
between overconfidence and performance.  
 
Our measure of overconfidence provides 
insights into Eisenhardt's (1989) finding 
that managers who followed specific 
processes in dynamic environments had 
greater confidence and improved 
performance.  They argued that one of the 
reasons for this relationship was that the 
managers’ confidence was well-founded 
because the process they followed 
generated better information. However, they 
did not actually examine the quality of the 
information that the managers used. Yet 
quality of information may be crucial 
(Forbes, 2007). Our study suggests that it is 
at least possible that increased confidence, 
even in the absence of increased initial 
accuracy, could have been associated with 
improved performance. 
 
It is interesting to compare our finding that 
overconfidence decreased planning with 
Forbes’ (2005) finding that decision 
comprehensiveness increased 
overconfidence. We believe these findings 
complement rather than contradict each 
other.  At a very general level, we are 
proposing that uncertainty of ones facts 
leads to information search, whereas Forbes 
(2005) found that this information search 
leads to greater, but unwarranted, certainty.  
Consistent with other scholars (Zacharakis 
& Shepherd, 2001), he argues that 
considering more information may increase 
an individual’s certainty without increasing 
their accuracy.  Clearly, though, to test the 
complementary nature of these findings, 
future research needs to rigorously measure 
how overconfidence and information search 
change and relate to each other over time.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Directions 
This study has some limitations that suggest 
future research directions. The demands 
placed on the study's respondents, such as 
being in a small company that had just 
introduced a new product and providing 
data twice during a year and a half period, 
limited the study's sample size.  The small 
size in turn decreases the power of the 
analysis while increasing the instability of 
the results. This, in turn, increases the 
likelihood that future studies may not 
replicate this study's results.  Given this 
study's exploratory nature, the multiple calls 
to conduct longitudinal research linking 
managerial cognition to firm actions and 
performance (e.g., Thomas et al., 1993), and 
the difficulty of this task, we believe that 
the sample size was reasonable. 
Furthermore, other studies (e.g., Adams, 
Nelson, & Todd, 1992) have used 
comparable sample size in running 
LISREL.  Moreover, we checked the 
modification index at the measurement and 
structural model levels and no major 
modifications were suggested.  In addition, 
the t-values for all the paths (Figure 2) are 
significant at the .01 level.  These findings 
provide evidence that the results are 
reliable. Finally, to the extent that the study 
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achieved significant results despite its small 
sample size, it served as a conservative test 
of the hypotheses.  
The study's small sample size restricted the 
number of control variables (Churchill, 
1979) related to both the individuals 
completing the questionnaire and the firm's 
outcomes.  We did, however, minimize this 
problem by constraining many conditions 
that could have affected outcomes.  For 
example, all the firms were small, 
introducing a product in the same industry, 
and were located in the same geographic 
area.  Also, the respondents were at roughly 
the same organizational level and were the 
individuals most responsible for the product 
introductions' success.  Clearly, however, if 
possible, future studies should strive to use 
larger samples and utilize more control 
variables, especially ones reflecting 
differences in individuals.  
 
In striving to make sure that managers faced 
very similar decision situations, we limited 
the study's generalizability.  Consistent with 
Whetten’s (1989) suggestion that 
exploratory research should focus on areas 
where the phenomenon of interest is most 
likely to be present, we examined smaller 
firms. Managers of these firms exhibit the 
overconfidence bias to a greater degree than 
their counterparts (Busenitz & Barney, 
1997).  We also examined dynamic 
environments, given that the information 
overload, high uncertainty, and high time 
pressures associated with these 
environments may make it likely that 
managers are overconfident (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997).  Dynamic environments 
were also worthy of study because they 
pose special challenges to learning and to 
achieving product introduction success 
given their relative lack of reliable and 
relevant data for decision making (Isabella 
& Waddock, 1994).  
 
 Several scholars (e.g., Forbes, 2005), 
however, have argued that the performance 
effects of biases and heuristics depend, in 
part, on the environment in which they are 
exhibited.  We concur.  For example, we do 
not necessarily believe that the relationships 
we uncovered exist in more stable 
environments or for larger firms, where 
planning may be crucial to success.  This 
belief, however, needs to be directly 
examined to test the boundary conditions of 
the relationships we uncovered. 
 
Managerial Implications 
We caution readers not to misinterpret or 
overstate our findings.  Our study is 
descriptive, not prescriptive. We are not 
stating that managers should do no 
planning.  Some planning and research may 
be beneficial.  Also, while we found that 
greater overconfidence may actually 
enhance product performance as compared 
to planning, it is very doubtful that 
overconfidence is an overall panacea or that 
it is without some negative ramifications.  
We do not suggest that we have uncovered 
the best way to generate new product 
performance.   
 
Other, more advantageous ways may exist. 
For example, Eisenhardt (1989; 2001) 
uncovered a detailed and comprehensive 
process that differed from planning, and 
allowed managers operating in dynamic 
environments to make decisions rapidly and 
effectively. Their process was quite 
specific, and went far beyond planning.  It 
explained, for example, when managers 
should collect information, what type of 
information they should use, and who they 
should involve in the planning process.  
Additionally, an article by Sykes and 
Dunham (1995) argues that the key to 
success lies in initially identifying one’s 
assumptions, and recognizing their 
uncertainty. Managers then need to act with 
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the explicit goal of testing and, as needed, 
modifying those assumptions. Grant (2003) 
suggests that planning systems which 
minimize the use of analytical processes, 
but lay out clear performance targets and 
corporate guidelines may enhance 
performance in dynamic environments.  
Similarly, McGrath and MacMillan (1995) 
suggest a unique planning process that may 
be especially beneficial by better enabling 
managers operating in dynamic 
environments to explore their assumptions. 
 
In fact, our study's findings 
notwithstanding, it may make sense to 
reduce overconfidence if one does so in 
combination with the alternative planning 
methods above.  Admittedly, though, it is 
difficult to correct the general tendency to 
be overconfident, and even increased 
awareness of the tendency does little to 
decrease the bias (Heuer, 1999; Russo & 
Schoemaker, 1992).  There are, however, 
several effective steps managers can take 
which focus on the process of how people 
make judgment and reach conclusion, rather 
than just focusing on the judgments and 
conclusions themselves (Heuer, 1999).  
These steps include techniques like devil's 
advocacy, eliciting outside expertise, and 
interdisciplinary brainstorming (Heuer, 
1999; Russo & Schoemaker, 1992). 
 
 Our research leaves many questions 
unanswered that were beyond this study's 
scope. We believe that early research needs 
to be evaluated not just by its results, but 
also by questions and the opportunities for 
future research it generates.  We do not 
view this paper as the ultimate answer, but 
rather as a first foray into understanding the 
complex interplay of cognitive biases, 
planning, and organizational outcomes. 
Nonetheless, this longitudinal study 
contributes to the literature by answering the 
calls of researchers (e.g., Staw, 1991) to 
examine the effects of overconfidence in a 
field setting and to test opposing assertions 
regarding those effects. The paper’s major 
contribution to the literature was identifying 
that planning mediated the relationship 
between overconfidence and product 
performance. It is our hope that this study 
serves as an important early step in 
examining these issues, and provides a 
building block for future work in this area. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, D., Nelson, R., & Todd, P. 1992. 
Perceived usefulness, ease of use, and 
information technology: A replication. 
MIS Quarterly, 16(2): 227-247. 
 
Anderson, J.C., & Gerbing, D.W. 1988. 
Structural equation modeling in 
practice: A review and recommended 
two-step approach. Psychological 
Bulletin, 103(3): 411-423. 
 
Astebro, T., Jeffrey, S. A., & Adomdza, G. 
K. 2007. Inventor perseverance after 
being told to quit: The role of cognitive 
biases. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 20(3), 253-272. 
9. 
Audia, P. G., Locke, E. A., & Smith, K., G. 
2000. The paradox of success: An 
archival and a laboratory study of 
strategic persistence following radical 
environmental change. Academy of 
Management Journal, 43, (5): 837- 854.  
 
Barczak, G. 1994. Gaining superior 
performance of new products in the 
telecommunications industry. Journal 
of Business & Industrial Marketing, 
9(4): 19-32. 
 
Baron, R.M. & Kenny, D.A. 1986. The 
moderator-mediator distinction in 
social psychological research. Journal 
38 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
of Personality and Social Psychology, 
51(6): 1173-1182.  
 
Bentler, P.M. 1990. Comparative fit indexes 
in structural models. Psychological 
Bulletin, 107 (2), 238-246. 
 
Bentler, P.M. & Bonnet, D.G. 1980. 
Significance tests and goodness-of-fit 
in the analysis of covariance structure. 
Psychological Bulletin, 88(3), 588-606. 
 
Blau, P. & Schoenherr, R. 1971.  The 
Structure of Organizations. Basic 
Books. NY, NY. 
 
Bogner, W. C., & Barr, P. C. 2000.  Making 
sense in hypercompetitive 
environments: A cognitive explanation 
for the persistence of high velocity 
competition. Organization Science, 
11(2): 212-226. 
 
Bourgeois, L. J., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 1988. 
Politics of strategic decision making in 
high-velocity environments: Toward a 
midrange theory. Academy of 
Management Journal, 31(4): 737-770. 
 
Brinckmann, J., Grichnik, D., & Kapsa, D. 
2010. Should entrepreneurs plan or just 
storm the castle? A meta-analysis on 
contextual factors impacting the 
business planning-performance 
relationship in small firms. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 25(1): 24. 
 
Brown S. & Eisenhardt, K 1997. The art of 
continuous change: Linking complexity 
theory and time-paced evolution in 
relentlessly shifting organizations. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 
42(1): 1-35. 
 
Busenitz, L. W., & Barney, J. B. 1997. 
Biases and heuristics in strategic 
decision making: Differences between 
entrepreneurs and managers in large 
organizations. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 12(1): 9-30. 
 
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. 1999. 
Overconfidence and excess entry: An 
experimental approach. American 
Economic Review, 89(1): 306-318. 
 
Churchill, G.A. 1979. A paradigm for 
developing better measures of 
marketing constructs. Journal of 
Marketing Research, 16(2): 64-73. 
 
Cohen, J., & Cohen, P., 1983. Applied 
multiple regression/correlation analysis 
for the behavioral sciences, 2nd ed. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Cooper, A.C., Folta, T.B. & Woo, C. 1995.  
Entrepreneurial information search. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 10(2): 
107-120.   
 
Cooper, R.G., & Kleinschmidt, E. J. 1996. 
Winning businesses and product 
development: Critical success factors. 
Research Technology Management, 
39(4): 18-32. 
 
Covin, J., Prescott, J., & Slevin, D. 1990. 
The effects of technological 
sophistication on strategic profiles, 
structure and firm performance. 
Journal of Management Studies, 27(5): 
485-509. 
 
Crossan, M., Cunha, M. P. E., & Cunha, J. 
2005. Time and organizational 
improvisation. Academy of 
Management Review, 30(1), 129-145.  
 
39 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
Crossan, M.,M., White, R. E., Lane, H. W., 
& Klus, L. 1996. The improvising 
organization: Where planning meets 
opportunity. Organizational Dynamics, 
24(4), 20-25. 
 
Day, G.S., & Nedungadi P. 1994. 
Managerial representations of 
competitive advantage. Journal of 
Marketing, 58: 31-44. 
 
Delvecchio, S., & Anselmi, K., 2006. Sales 
force automation tools for small 
business. Journal of Small Business 
Strategy. 16(2); 15. 
 
Dess, G. G., & Robinson, R. B., Jr.  1984. 
Measuring organizational performance 
in the absence of objective measures: 
The case of the privately-held firm and 
conglomerate business unit.  Strategic 
Management Journal, 4(3): 265-273. 
 
D'Souza, R., & Kemelgor, B. 2008. Does 
expertise matter in an ever-changing 
and uncertain environment? A study of 
the entrepreneurial process of serial and 
novice entrepreneurs. Journal of Small 
Business Strategy, 19(2), 69-87. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M.  1989. Making fast 
strategic decisions in high-velocity 
environments.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 32(3): 543-576. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M.  2001. Speed and 
strategic choice: How managers 
accelerate decision making. California 
Management Review, 50(2): 102-116. 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. & Tabrizi, B. 1995.  
Accelerating adaptive processes: 
Product innovation in the global 
computer industry.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 40(1): 84-110. 
 
Fiske, S., & Taylor, S. 1991.  Social 
Cognition, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc.  
 
Forbes, D. 2005. Are some entrepreneurs 
more overconfident than others?  
Journal of Business Venturing, 20(5): 
623-640. 
 
Forbes, D. 2007. Reconsidering the 
strategic implications of decision 
comprehensiveness. The Academy of 
Management Review, 32(2), 361-376. 
 
Fredrickson, J. W., & Mitchell, T. R.  1984. 
Strategic decision processes: 
Comprehensiveness and performance 
in an industry with an unstable 
environment.  Academy of Management 
Journal, 27(2): 399-423. 
 
Galbraith J. 1977. Organization Design. 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Co.  
 
Ghiselli, E.E., Campbell, J.P., & Zedeck, 
J.P., 1981. Measurement Theory for the 
Behavioral Sciences, Freeman, San 
Francisco, CA. 
 
Grant, R. 2003. Strategic planning in a 
turbulent environment: Evidence from 
the oil majors. Strategic Management 
Journal, 24(6): 491-517. 
 
Haley, U. C. V., & Stumpf, S. A. 1989. 
Cognitive trails in strategic decision-
making: Linking theories of 
personalities and cognitions. Journal of 
Management Studies, 26(5): 477-497. 
 
Hayward, M. L. A., Shepherd, D. A., & 
Griffin, D. 2006. A hubris theory of 
entrepreneurship. Management 
Science, 52(2):160-172. 
 
40 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
Hayward, M., Forster, W., Sarasvathy, S., 
& Fredrickson, B. 2010. Beyond 
hubris: How highly confident 
entrepreneurs rebound to venture again. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 25(6): 
569. 
 
Hedstrom, P. & Swedberg, R. 1998, Social 
Mechanisms. Cambridge, U.K., 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Heuer, R. 1999. Psychology of Intelligence 
Analysis.  Center for the Study of 
Intelligence,  Central Intelligence 
Agency.  Langley, VA. 
 
Houghton, S., Simon, M., Aquino, K., & 
Goldberg, C., 2000. No safety in 
numbers: Persistence of biases and 
their effects on team risk perception 
and team decision making. Group and 
Organization Management, 25(4): 325-
353. 
 
Iacobucci, D., 2008, Mediation Analysis. 
SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
CA.  
 
Iacobucci, D., Saldahna, N., & Deng, X. 
2007. A mediation on mediation: 
Evidence that structural equations 
models perform better than regression. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
17(2): 139-153.   
 
Isabella, L. & Waddock, S. 1994. Top 
management team certainty: 
Environmental assessments, teamwork, 
and performance implications. Journal 
of Management, 20(4): 834-859.  
 
Joreskog, K. G., & Sorbom, D., 1989. 
LISREL Analysis of Structural 
Relationships by the Method of 
Maximum Likelihood. Scientific 
Software, Inc., Moorsville, IN. 
Keh, H., Foo, M., & Lim, B. 2002. 
Opportunity evaluation under risky 
conditions: The cognitive processes of 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship: 
Theory and Practice, 27(2), 125-149. 
 
Kelly, D., & Amburgey, T. 1991. 
Organizational inertia and momentum: 
A dynamic model of strategic change. 
Academy of Management Journal, 
34(3), 591-591. 
 
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., & 
Covin, J. G. 2004. Meta-analyses of 
post-acquisition performance: 
Indications of unidentified moderators. 
Strategic Management Journal, 25(2), 
181-187. 
 
Klayman, J., Soll, J., Gonzalez-Vallejo, J., 
& Barlas, S. 1999. Overconfidence: It 
depends on how, what, and whom you 
ask. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 79(3): 
216-247. 
 
Liao, J., Welsch, H., & Stoica, M. 2008. 
Environmental turbulence and scanning 
behavior: The moderating effects of 
organizational maturity. Journal of 
Small Business Strategy, 19(1), 15-31. 
 
Lynn, G. S., Morone, J. G., & Paulson, A. 
S. 1996. Marketing and discontinuous 
innovation: The probe and learn 
process. California Management 
Review, 38(3): 8-38.  
 
Mahajan, J. 1992.  The overconfidence 
effect in marketing and management 
predictions. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 34: 329-342.  
 
Maidique, M.A. & Zirger, E. J. 1985. The 
new product learning cycle. Research 
Policy, 14: 299-313. 
41 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
 
McDougall, P., & Oviatt, B. (1996). New 
venture internationalization, strategic 
change, and performance: A follow-up 
study. Journal of Business Venturing, 
11(1): 23-23. 
 
McGrath, R. & MacMillan, I. 1995.  
Discovery-driven planning. Harvard 
Business Review  73(4): 44-51.  
 
McNamara, G. & Bromiley, P. 1997. 
Decision making in an organizational 
setting: Cognitive and organizational 
influences on risk assessment in 
commercial lending. Academy of 
Management Journal, 40(5): 1063-
1088. 
 
Miller, D. 1996. A preliminary typology of 
organizational learning: Synthesizing 
the literature. Journal of Management, 
22(3): 485-506. 
 
Milliken, F. J. 1987. Three types of 
perceived uncertainty about the 
environment: state, effect, and response 
uncertainty. Academy of Management 
Review, 12(1): 133-144. 
 
Nunnally, J.C., 1978. PsychometricTheory. 
McGraw Hill, New York. 
 
Nystrom, P.C. & Starbuck, W. 1984. To 
avoid organizational crisis, unlearn. 
Organizational Dynamics, 13:53-65. 
 
Parker, S. 2006. Learning about the 
unknown: How fast do entrepreneurs 
adjust their beliefs? Journal of Business 
Venturing, 21(1): 1-26. 
 
Russo, E. & Schoemaker, P. Managing 
Overconfidence. Sloan Management 
Review, 33(2): 7.  
 
Schwenk, C. R. 1986. Information, 
cognitive biases, and commitment to a 
course of action. Academy of 
Management Review, 11(2): 298-310. 
 
Segars, A.H. 1997. Assessing the 
unidimensionality of measurement: A 
paradigm and illustration within the 
context of information systems 
research. Omega 25(1) 107-121. 
 
Simon, M. & Houghton, S. M. 2003. The 
relationship between overconfidence 
and the introduction of riskier products: 
Evidence from a field study. Academy 
of Management Journal, 46(2): 139-
149. 
 
Simon, M., Houghton, S. M., & Aquino, K. 
2000.  Cognitive biases, risk 
perception, and venture formation:  
How individuals decide to start 
companies.  Journal of Business 
Venturing, 15(2): 113-134. 
 
Simon, M., Houghton, S., & Savelli, S. 
2003. Out of the frying pan...? Why 
small business managers introduce 
high-risk products. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 18(3): 419-434. 
 
Soll, J. 1996. Determinants of 
overconfidence and miscalibration: The 
roles of random error and ecological 
structure. Organizational Behavior & 
Human Decision Processes, 65(2): 
117-137. 
 
Staw, B. M. 1991. Dressing up like an 
organization: When psychological 
theories can explain organizational 
action. Journal of Management, 17(4): 
805-819. 
 
Steiger, J.H. & Lind, J.C. 1980. Statistically 
based tests for the number of common 
42 
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
43 
factors, Paper presented at the 
Psychometric Society Annual Meeting, 
Iowa City, IA.  
 
Sykes, H. B. & Dunham, D. 1995.  Critical 
assumptions planning: A practical tool 
for managing business development 
risk.  Journal of Business Venturing, 
10: 413-424. 
 
Thomas, J. B., Clark, S. M., & Gioia, D. A. 
1993.  Strategic sensemaking and 
organizational performance: Linkages 
among scanning, interpretation, action, 
and outcomes.  Academy of 
Management Journal, 36(2), 239-270. 
 
Weick, K.E. 2001. Friendly fire: The 
accidental shootdown of U.S. black 
hawks over northern Iraq. 
Administrative Science Quarterly: 
46(1), 147-151. 
 
Whetten, D. A. 1989. What constitutes a 
theoretical contribution?  Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4): 490-495. 
 
Yates, J.F., Lee, J., Shinotsuka, H., 
Patalano, A.L., & Sieck, W.R. 1998.  
Cross cultural variations in probability 
judgment accuracy: Beyond general 
knowledge overconfidence? 
Organizational  Behavior & Human 
Decision Processes, 74(2): 89-117. 
 
Zacharakis, A. L., & Shepherd, D. A. 2001. 
The nature of information and 
overconfidence on venture capitalists’ 
decision making. Journal of Business 
Venturing, 16(4): 311-333. 
 
Zhao, X., Lynch, J.G., & Chen, Q. 2010. 
Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: 
Myths and truths about mediation 
analysis. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 37(August): 197-206. 
 
Mark Simon is an Associate Professor of 
Strategic Management, at Oakland 
University, Michigan, USA. He received his 
Bachelors of Science from Babson College 
with a concentration in Entrepreneurship. 
He obtained an MBA and Ph.D. at Georgia 
State University in August of 1996. He has 
publications in the area of entrepreneurial 
decision making in multiple journals. 
 
Susan Houghton is an Associate Professor 
of Strategic Management at North Carolina 
A&T State University.  She received her 
B.A. from Yale University, and her M.B.A. 
and Ph.D. from The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her research 
focuses on small business management, 
strategic planning and managerial 
cognition.  
 
John Kim is an Associate Professor of 
Marketing at Oakland University.  His area 
of teaching and interest is consumer 
behavior, especially decision making. 
 
Xiaodong Deng is an Associate Professor 
of Management Information 
Systems at Oakland University. He received 
his Ph.D. in Manufacturing 
Management and Engineering from The 
University of Toledo. His research 
has appeared in Journal of Management 
Information Systems, Decision 
Sciences, Information and Management, 
Information Resources Management 
Journal, and Journal of Intelligent 
Manufacturing. His research 
interests are in post-implementation 
information technology learning, 
information systems benchmarking, and 
information technology acceptance 
and diffusion.
Journal of Small Business Strategy                                                           Volume 22, Number 1,  
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Eighteen months after we gathered the first wave of data, we contacted the original companies 
and mailed the manager most responsible for the product introduction a questionnaire about 
problems his or her product encountered. In 87 percent of the cases, this individual was the 
same person who had responded 18 months earlier. To increase response rate, we conducted 
multiple follow-up calls and mailings and provided all participants with two free movie 
tickets. We also entered respondents in a drawing for a dinner for two at an exclusive 
restaurant in Georgia (valued at over $100). To track firms that had moved, we used state 
phone directories and Internet search engines to look up both the name of the company and 
the name of its employees. The eight firms that failed to respond either refused to participate 
or were impossible to contact, possibly because they were acquired, moved, or failed. 
Although survivor and response bias is a consideration, the concern was minimized by the 
high response rate, as well as the fact that non-respondents had potentially positive (e.g., 
being acquired) and negative (e.g., failing) outcomes (McDougall & Oviatt, 1996). 
Furthermore, there was no statistical difference at the five percent level between those firms 
completing both parts of the study and those that dropped out on the data that was collected 
during the first wave including number of the firm's employees, firm age, or the level of the 
manager's overconfidence. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Overconfidence: Executives circled the answer they thought was correct ("A" or "B") to the 
questions below. Then, in the last column, they recorded their level of confidence by 
indicating a percentage ranging from 50 to 100%.  For example, if they thought there was a 
three out of four chance that they chose the correct answer, they would than indicate a 75% 
level of confidence.  Fifty percent indicated a pure guess. 
 
Respondents' overconfidence was determined by averaging their level of confidence for all 
questions and subtracting the percentage of items correct.  If their average level of confidence 
was greater than the percentage of items correct, then overconfidence occurred.  This measure 
generated a continuous variable. 
 
 Questions                 Answers  Level of 
 Confidence 
1. What percent of businesses with 
fewer than 100 employees use PCs? 
A. Over 80% B. Under 70% __________ 
2. From October, 1994 to March, 1995 
which company sold more PCs in the 
U.S.? 
A. Compaq 
    Computer 
B. Packard Bell 
Electronics 
__________ 
3. Which of the following PC 
"markets" grew more rapidly last year? 
A. Retail sales B. Corporate 
    Sales 
__________ 
4. In 1994, Lotus Development ... A. Lost money B. Made a profit __________ 
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5. What percent of new computer users 
utilize PC magazines to help them buy 
software? 
A. More than 
    Half 
B. Less than 
    Half 
 
__________ 
6. Relative to 1991 sales, how much 
did Compaq's sales increase by in 
1994? 
A. Less than 
    Double 
B. Over triple __________ 
7. What percent of computer owners 
use educational software? 
A. About 66% B. About 40% __________ 
 
Planning: planning was measured using the average score on the three-item scale, below. 
 
I prefer careful and thorough analysis rather than intuition if it 
affects results 
1 2 3 4 5 
My strategic decisions are generally more affected by industry 
experience and lessons learned by formal research and systematic 
evaluation* 
1 2 3 4 5 
We develop and use a detailed plan when marketing our products   1 2 3 4 5 
 
Product Performance was measured using the five-item bipolar scale below. Respondents were 
asked to circle the number that best captured their product introduction's potential financial 
performance. For example, for the first item below they would circle a "1" if the product has not 
led to a major increase in overall company financial performance and a "7" if it has led to a 
major increase in overall company financial performance. Responses for the five items were 
averaged. 
 
The product … 
has not led to a major 
increase in overall company 
financial performance. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
has led to a major increase 
in overall company financial 
performance. 
fell far below profit goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 far exceeded profit goals. 
fell far below sales goals. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 far exceeded sales goals. 
fell far below market share 
goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 far exceeded market share 
goals 
has achieved a far higher 
market share than 
competitor's  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 has achieved a far lower 
market share than 
competitor's.* 
 
Firm Size was captured using the log of number of company employees.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Items denoted with an asterisk are reverse coded. 
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Cross-functional communication: We measured cross-functional communication using two-
items. 
 
We utilized a cross-functional team to introduce this 
product. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
There was substantial communication between functional 
areas regarding this product. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Past Performance: The measure is reproduced below. 
 
 How important is this performance 
measure to the company? 
 How satisfied are you with the 
company’s achievement on this 
measure? 
  Not Important    Very Important        Not Satisfied  Very Satisfied   
Sales Growth   1 2 3          4            5            1         2         3          4         5 
Net Profit Margin  1 2 3          4            5            1         2         3          4         5 
Cash Flow    1 2 3          4            5            1         2         3          4         5 
Market share   1 2 3          4            5            1         2         3          4         5 
Ret. on Equity   1 2 3          4            5            1         2         3          4         5 
Ret. on Assets   1 2 3          4            5            1         2         3          4         5 
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